November 8, 2019. At 10:15. In seminar room 150 at the Publicum building of the University of Turku (Assistentinkatu 7).
dr. Adam Bricker discusses:
Is Cognitive Neuroepistemology Possible?
There are presently two basic types of observations on the basis of which epistemologists might make inferences about the nature of the concept of knowledge—traditional methodology utilizes the introspective judgements of individual philosophers, and experimental methodology utilizes sets of lay attribution reports. Previously unconsidered is that epistemological inferences might also be formed on the basis of neurocognitive measures of knowledge attribution, a method I’ll refer to as “cognitive neuroepistemology.” My aim here is to both (i) describe a conceptual framework on which to understand the epistemological potential of this method and (ii) explore its prospects for successful implementation. Conceptually, as cognitive neuroepistemology has the potential to reveal attributive differences undetectable by conventional means, we have good reason to suspect that it might provide the basis for new, previously unavailable inferences about the concept of knowledge. Bolstering this plausibility, I present early results from an EEG study of knowledge attribution, which indicate that there are indeed observable neural differences between knowledge evaluation and other types of epistemic judgement.
Last updated: 30.10.2019