The Historical Premise: The Pessimistic Meta-Induction and the Philosophy of History

Abstract

The pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) is regarded as one of the most successful arguments against scientific realism. It is an inductive argument which moves from the observation that many empirically successful scientific theories have later been disproved, to the conclusion that our best current scientific theories are likely false. The argument rests on a historical premise: the claim that there are sufficiently many such successful but false scientific theories in history. Here I challenge the viability of the historical premise in debates about the metaphysical status of science. When relying on the historical premise, the scientific anti-realist must adopt either historical realism or anti-realism. If they adopt historical realism, then the historical premise and the conclusion of the PMI cannot both be true. Conversely, if they adopt historical anti-realism, then the induction fails. Thus, we cannot use the PMI to conclude that scientific anti-realism is true. In doing so, I show that our common understanding of observability does not straightforwardly apply to intellectual history, and how this complicates debates about realism in the philosophy of history