The Return of Truth in an Age of Post-Truth: What Historical Theorists Can Do

Abstract

Where are historical theorists when you need them? In a recent article, Nancy Partner deplores the “abyss” separating “the finespun sophisticated concerns of historical theorists” from “sledgehammer attacks” on historical scholarship that are now being reported even from countries that used to pose as lands of freedom. In an age of “post-truth,” Partner suggests, historians need a robust concept of truth. But to what extent are historical theorists willing or able to provide them with one? This paper argues that Partner’s question deserves to be taken seriously, especially insofar as she does something more subtly than advocating a return to correspondence theories of truth. Drawing on a broad array of sources, the paper shows that when historians talk about truth, they mostly do so with an eye to the evidentiary standards of their discipline – that is, to practices of justification that distinguish historical scholarship from other genres of writing. Briefly put, this is to say that historians mean “justification” when they say “truth.” What, then, can historical theorists do? Should they accept the equation or explain that truth is a redundant concept in contexts of justification? The paper discusses five possible ways in which historical theorists might respond to Partner’s question. It concludes by suggesting that a choice between these options depends, among other things, on context sensitivity (what is going on in the world?) and positionality (how do historical theorists want to position themselves vis-à-vis philosophical notions of truth and historians’ concerns about an “age of post-truth”?).